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THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.

OPENING EXERCISES OF THE LAW
SCHOOL.
The opening exercises of the Law School
were held in the large lecture room in the
Law Building at 4 p. m. Wednesday, Oct.
1st. George Edward Reed, LL. D., President of the Law School, -presided, and
made the principal address.
After expressing his gratification at seeing so many of the old men back, he proceeded to give a few words of advice to the
new students, telling them the profession
they had chosen was one of endless work
-and that the only way they could succeed under Dr. Trickett was by hard and
consistent work.
In speaking of the Faculty, his reference
to the improvement in Dr. Trickett's
health and his praise of Prof. Woodward,
who resigned to become a member of the
Faculty of the Northwestern University,
brought forth applause, which demonstrated the high esteem in which both
men are held by the student body.
After the formal opening address, Dr.
Reed introduced the members of the Faculty, each of whom made short addresses.

The members of the Faculty
were: Dr. Trickett, Judge $adler,
Weakley, Prof. Sadler, Major
Professors Hutton, Schwartz and
han.

present
Senator
Pilcher,
McKee-

THE NEW MEMBERS OP THE
FACULTY
The vacancy in the faculty caused by
the resignation of Professor Woodward,
has been filled by the appointment of J.
White Hutton, of Chumnbermburg, and Jos.
P. McKeehan, of Carlisle.
Professor Hutton is eminiently qualified
for the important poAitlon.ha now holds.
He is a graduate of Gettysburg College, a
member of the Franklin County Bar, and
a graduate of Harvard Law School. In
1897, when he had completed his course at
Gettysburg, he immediately took up the
study of law in the office of Congressman
Thaddeus Mahon of Chambersburg, and
for two years studied under the direction
of that learned lawyer. He was then admitted to the Franklin County Bar. Realizing the importance of a thorough legal
education in order to attain any degree of
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prominence in the legdl world, and possessing the ambition to forge to the front in
his chosen profession, lie entered the Harvard Law School immediately after his
admission to the bar, graduating from that
institution in the class of '02, with the degree of LL. B.
He stood high in his
class, and was strongly recomihended by
the Dean of the Harvard Law Department
when he applied for this position.

j.

Reed an instructor in the Preparatory
School.
His work there was so satisfactory that
he was soon promoted to the vice-principalship of that department. Three years
as an instructor convinced him that he
would not be contented in that profession,
so he resigned to take up the study of law.
Entering the Law School in 1900, he was
graduated in 1902, completing in the two
years, the three year course.

WITE 91UTTON, A. M., LL. B.

Although Professor Hutton has been a
member of our Faculty for a short while,
he has already favorably impressed the
other members of the Faculty and the student body
He possesses a thorough
knowlege of his subjects and imparts this
knowledge with lucidity and satisfactoriness. Tn the lecture room he is courteous
and considerate, and manifests a degree of
interest in his subject that holds the attention of his class from the moment he
begins the lecture.
He teaches the following subjects: Bankruptcy, Partnership and Decedents' Estates.
Professor McKeehan is so well known to
the alumni and the students of the Law
School that he requires no introduction.
Graduating from Dickinson College in
1897, he was immediately appointed by Dr.

JOS. P. MCKEEHAN, A. M., LL. E.

As a student, he was conscientious and
thorough. In the college.he won the prize
offered for the best entrance examination
in his Freshman year, and in his Sophomore and Junior years he was honorably
mentioned for general excellency in his
.work. In the Law School, in his first
year, he won the Dean's prize for the best
examination in Evidence, and although
he carried extra work his work in the class
room, at all times, was of a character that
represented careful and persistent study.
He possesses a well disciplined and analytical mind, a forceful power of expression, and a thoroughness in the presentation
of his subject. From the comments of his
classes, we predict for him a record as an
instructor as brilliant as his record as a
student.
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PROFESSOR WOODWARD.
The current number of the American
Law School Review, published in St. Paul,
Minn., contains the following reference to
Professor Woodward:
"The city of Chicago has recently gained
two promising young law school professors. ir. Frederic C. Woodward, who
has been engaged to fill the position of
Professor of Law in the Northwestern
University, was graduated from the Cornell University Law School in 1894. The
next year he received the degree of LL. M.
at Cornell, and delivered a course of lectures on Real Property at the Cornell
Summer Law School. After three years
of practice in New York city, he became,
in 1898, a member of the Faculty of the
Dickinson Law School, at Carlisle, Pa.
In the Northwestern University Law
School, Mr. Woodward will have charge of
the subjects of Contracts, Trusts, Sales,
Code Pleading and Bankruptcy."
The withdrawal of Prof. Woodward
from the Faculty is regretted by both
students and alumni of the Dickinson
School of Law.
In addition to a thorough mastery of his
subjects, and the ability to classify and
present knowledge in such form and manner as to be mosb readily comprehended
and retained by his students, he possessed
those probably rarer qualities that enabled
him to mix with the student body, to
share their feelings, to realize their difficulties, to gain their confidence--in a
word, to become their personal friend.
Hence, distance does not sever the double
bond of respect for the instructor and love
for the friend, and the most hearty good
wishes of all follow Prof. Woodward into
his new field.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
The Allison Society begins the year under propitious conditions. The members
oflast year's classes, who have returned, are
excellent workers and are interested in the
society's welfare. Many of the new students who have listened to the programmes
have favorably commented upon them
and have submitted their names for membership. Among theseare several excellent
debaters and elocutionists. At the first
regular meeting this year, a corps of officers
were elected from whom great results are
expected. They are as follows:
President-Jos. E. Fleitz.

Vice-President--G. F. Oldt.
Secretary-Paul Willis.
Treasurer-Roger J. Dever.
Executive Committee-F. P. Benjamin,
A. T. Walsh and Harry A. Hillyer.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The first regular meeting of the Dickinson society was held on Friday evening,
October 3, 1902, Albertson presiding, he
having been elected at the last meetingof
the preceding school year. The meeting
was well attended by both old and new
men. Since the third of October, two regular meetings have been held, ard both
meetings were well attended. The Executive committee, so far, has not had the difficulty that it contended with last year;
namely, in the reluctance of the members
to participate in the programmes. The
members now realize the good to be derived from participation in the programme
and are striving to get as much benefit as
possible therefrom.
So far the names of thirteen members of
the Junior class have been proposed for
membership.. This speaks well for the
committee that was appointed to look out
for new members.
PROMINENT PRACTITIONER'S
DEATH.
In Reading, during the summer, occurred
the death of one of the most eminent
members of the Pennsylvania Bar, J. H.
Jacobs, Sr., father of J. H. Jacobs, Jr., of
the Middle Class. Deceased had been a
member of the Berks County Bar for over
25 years, during which time he distinguished himself as a trial lawyer and a
counsellor. He possessed extraordinary
qualities as a trial lawyer, winning nearly
every case in which he participated. He
was considered one of the best criminal
lawyers in the State. Death was due to
kidney trouble.
NEWS OF THE ALUMNI.
Walter Schanz, '02, has been admitted
to the Lackawanna County Bar and has become associated with John M. Harris, a
member of the Board of Examiners of that
county. The work of Mr. Schanz, in the
bar examination, was so thorough that it
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attracted the attention of Mr. Harris, with
the result that he requested Mr. Schanz to
enter his office.

wanna County Bar, having passed creditably the difficult examination prescribed
by the Examining Board of that county.

John M. Adamson and Robert H. Moon,
who graduated last June, are located in
Parkersburg, W. Va., and will practice
law in that state.

L. P. Holcomb, '01, is a candidate on
the Republican ticket for Representative
of the Sixth Legislative district, Luzerne
county. The district being Republican,
and he being popular, the prospects of his
being elected are bright.

T. A. Donahoe, '02, has been admitted
to the Lackawanna County Bar. Since his
admission, he has taken an active part in
politics. In the Democratic County Convention he nominated T. P. Hoban for
Judge of the Orphans' Court, and has been
appointed assistant secretary of the Democratic committee of Lackawanna County.
Jay Crary, of last year's Middle Class,
and Ralph White, of the class of '04, did
not return to school this term. They have
gone west and are in the real estate business in Warren, Wash.
Win. E. Elmes, chairman of the Forumn
Board last year, is practicing law in Columbia County. He has been appointed
solicitor of the West Berwick borough.
W. W. Johnson, '01, a member of the
Lackawanna County Bar, is with Jessup &
Jessup, one of the largest law firms in
Scranton. He recently made his initial
appearance in court and creditably conducted his case.
William Osborntm, of the class of,02, is in
St. Louis, where he intends to practice
law.
Florence Helreigle, a member of the
present Senior Class in its Junior year, but
who did not return the second year, having accepted a lucrative position in the
Internal Revenue Departmentin Scranton,
was recently appointed cashier of the South
Side Saving Bank, Scranton, a new corporation. Prior to his appointment, he
-had been admitted to the Lackawanna
County Bar.
Shortly after graduating, John Minnich
and Win. Points, of the class of '02, were
admitted to the Bedford County Bar.
J. E. Brennan, '02, will practice law in
Carbondale and Scranton.
During'the
summer, he was admitted to the Lacka-

P. T. Lonergan,'02, was admitted during
the summer to the Susquehanna County
Bar, and is practicing law in Montrose. He
is associated with Attorney Ainey of that
place, and is solicitor for one of the school
districts in the vicinity of Montrose.
Harpel, of the class of '01, has located in
Chicago. He will practice his profession
there.
During the illness of District Attorney
Jones of Luzerne county, this fall, John
Williams, '97, who is first assistant to the
District Attorney, creditably conducted the
affairs of that office. During the time
that he had charge, several important cases
came up for trial, in all of which Mr. Williams appeared for the Commonwealth,
conducting the cases with skill and suc-4
cess.
In Carlisle, this summer, were celebrated the marriages of two of our prominent alumni: J. F. Gilroy, of Scranton,
class of '96, and W. A. Rockow, of York,
class of '97. The former was united in
marriage to Miss Virginia Tabb McIntire,
on Sept. 4th; and the latter to Miss Maude
Hackman, on Sept. 16th. Both young
ladies were residents of Carlisle. We wish
both couples a happy and prosperous matrimonial voyage.
The numerous friends of McGuffie, who
was prominent in athletic circles here in
'00 and '01, will be interested in knowing
that he was united in marriage this summer to Miss Nora Hankee, of Pittston.
The marriage ceremony was performed at
the home of the bride. At present, he is
traveling for the firm of Benedict & Brown,
wholesale grocers.
The alumni who visited in town during
this month were Boryer, '02, who is prac-
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tieing in Perry county, and Rothermel,
'00, who is a member of the Berks Count
Bar.
In the September issue of the Law Students' .Helper, the address delivered by
Wma. E. Elmes at the Law School's Commencement exercises last June was published in a prominent place. This recognition is a tribute to the excellency of the
address, for that magazine publishes only
articles of that character that possess unusual merit.
Robert K. MacConnell, '02. is registered
in tue office of Attorney R. .M. Ewing, of
Pittsburg, the rules of that county requiring attorneys from other counties who seek
admission there to register six months
prior to the examination. He will take
the bar examination the second week in
December.
ITEMS OF INTEREST ABOUT THE
SCHOOL.
It is sincerely hoped that the work of
the Historical Society will be taken up this
year with renewed activity. Activity
along the lines for which the society was
organized will be of incalculable benefit
to the Law Students and to the Law
School. It will not only win the commendation of the State Bar Association at
whose suggestion the society was organized here, but it will keep alive the memories of the Pennslyvania jurists whose integrity and learning have done much to elevate and maintain the dignity of the legal
profession throughout the State. Every
friend of the school can appreciate the importance of possessing the commendation
of the most powerful legal organization in
the State, and every student of law can appreciate the benefits of an acquaintanceship with the lives of the learned jurists of
this state.
Bishop, of the Senior class, has been
elected president of the College Glee Club.
He has sung with the Club since entering
the Law School, two years ago.
Hindman, of last year's Junior class, was
in town recently. He has accepted a position with The American Surety Company
of Pittsburg, and will locate in that city.

His position enabling him to continue his
law studies, he has entered the Pittsburg
Law Schob1 and will complete his law
course there.
The Middle class reorganized immediately after the opening of the Law School
and elected the following officers:
President-C. W Flynn.
Vice-President--E. Carlin.
Secretary-M. Morehouse.
Treasurer-W. C. Smith.
At a subsequent meeting, the class selected its representatives for the Microcosm.
They are:
Editor-R. D. Cook.
Assistant Editors-Arthur H. James and
C. F. Albertson.
Business Managers-Thomas S. Lanard
and G. R. Wilcox.
The forerunner of the movement to
establish uniform rules for admission to
the bar throughout the State was the appointment by the Supreme Court of a committee to recommend a course of study for
admission to that court. It is expected
that the course of study prescribed for admission to the highest court in the State
will be adopted by every subordinate
county in the State. Washington county
is the first county to endorse the moveinent. In August, the court of that county
adopted a rule, admitting to practice in
the various courts of that county any person who has been or shall have been admitted to the Supreme Court. As soon as
the Supreme Court has adopted the new
rules for admission, it is expected that
many other counties will adopt a rule
similar to that adopted by the court of
Washington county.
The following Law men were initiated
to the secrecies of the fraternities during
the past month: Lloyd and Vera, Delta
Chi; Kress and Wilcox, Phi Delta Theta;
Barnhart, Phi Kappa Psi.
Without any strife or wire pulling the
Junior class elected the following officers,
shortly after the opening of the school:
President-Arthur Reeser.
Vice-President--S. B. Park.
Secretary-Miss Miller.
Treasurer-Paul Menges.
Historian-Wolf.
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entered to make a purchase at 8 p. m. on a
dark evening in November. While in the
store
the electric lights went suddenly out,
TION SALES. The remedies and liabilities
and the room was in perfect darkness for
ofpurchasers thereat. By John C. Eleber,
a minute, during which time something
of the Wasghington Bar. Banks Law Pubwas pushed against his legs, and he was
lishing Company, N. Y.
thrown down to the floor. When the
In this work, the author treats of the
lights were restored, no explanation of the
nature ofjudicial and execution sales, and
affair
was apparent, nor has a~ly become
the rights and remedies of purchasers at
apparent
since. Trespass against Trollope.
these sales. He also briefly discusses the
BOOK REVIEW.

KLEBER"S VOID JUDICIAL AND EXECU-

curative and special statutes, authorizing
involuntary sales. In the treatment of
the various kinds of sales, the author carefully and lucidly distinguishes the difference between each sale, and mentions the
general characteristic of each sale. He
includes under this head many practical
propositions, arranging them so that the
busy practitioner might conveniently find
the discussion of the proposition that he
desires. The promiscuous use of technical
terms is carefully avoided throughout the
work. Whenever they are used the technical and untechnical use of the terms is
clearly distinguishable. A feature of the
work and one that considerably augments
its practical utility is the arrangement of
the references. These are parallel with
the American Decisions, American Reporters, and the National Reporter system.
The references are thorough, and are conveniently arranged. The discussions of the
statutes are necessarily brief, but are sufficiently thorough to present their meaning
and interpretation. The arrangement of
its contents, the thoroughness of its discussions, and the lucidity of the style contribute to its attractiveness and utility. It
is a work that should be in the hands of
every lawyer.

Acknowledged-Review will follow..
ABBOTT'S TRIAL BRIEFs.-A brief for
the trial of criminal cases. By Austin
Abbott, assisted by Win. C. Beecher, late
Assistant District Attorney of New York.
Second and enlarged edition. Lawyers'
Co-operative Publishing Co., Bochester,
N . Y., 1902.

MOOT COURT.
JOHN GIVEN vs. WM. TROLLOPE.
Trespas-Dutytoward persons on premises by invitation-Duty to keep safe.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Trollope kept a store, into which Given

SPENCER and WILLIS for plaintiff.

By opening a store, and inviting the
public to come into their place of business,
shopkeepers assume a duty to those who
enter there to deal with them. Woodruff
v. Painter, 150 Pa. 95.
If negligence be the most probable hypothesis by which the injury can be explained, it is incumbent on t he defendant
to disprove it by showing due care. Lake
Shore R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa.
540.
WILLER and KNAPPENBERGER for defendant.
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove negligence on the part of defendant.
121 Pa. 238; 92 Pa. 40; 119 Pa. 20; 96 Pa. 83.
There is no liability for injury caused by
an accident which could not be foreseen
and guarded against. 195 Pa. 599; 198 Pa.
112.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The only evidence as to the cause of the
injury complained of in this case, or of the
peculiar circumstances surrounding it, is
that furnished by plaintiff.
The first question in this case for consideration is,-what duty or degree of care
did the defendant owe the plaintiff when
he entered his, the defendant's place of
business to make a purchase? The class
to which customers belong include persons
who go to a place of business not as mere
volunteers or licensees, but who go upon
business which concerns the occupier, and
upon his invitation expressed or implied.
When Trollope, the .defendant in this
case, opened his store, he thereby invited
the public to come into his place of business to make purchases in the usual manner; and when he extended this invitation,
he assumed a duty to all those who should
respond to such invitation. Woodruff v.
Painter, 150 Pa. 95. It is also the duty of
the owner of a place of business to keep his
premises in safe condition, so as to insure
a safe ingress and egress to those who lawfully enter. Carleton v. Iron Co., 99 Mass.
216. The plaintiff (Given) being lawfully
there, became an invited licensee, and as
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such the defendant owed to him reasonable care and diligence for his safety, not
only while he is actually doing his business, but while he is entering and leaving.
Was the defendant guilty of negligence
which resulted in the injury complained
of? Negligence is defined to be: "That
failure to exercise such care, prudence and
forethought as under the circumstances
duty requires to be given or exercised."Spencer v. Campbell, 9 W. & S. 32. Plaintiff alleges that, while the store was in
darkness, something was pushed against
his legs, throwing him to the floor and injuring him. No explanation of the affair
was made at the time or since. While it
is the law that negligence is not to be presumed from the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured while in the store of the
defendant, yet the manner in which the
injury is done may be such that negligence
is the most probable hypothesis by which
it can be explained. In no instance can
the bare fact that an injury has happened
-of itself and divorced from all surrounding circumstances-justify the inference
that the injury was caused by negligence.
It is alsq true that direct proof of negligence is not necessary ; like any other fact
negligence may be established by the proof
of circumstances from which its existence
may be inferred. Hendrick v. Potts, 41
L. R. A. 479. The case of Huey v. Gahlenbeck, 121 Pa. 238, relied upon by
defendant, differs from the case at bar, in
as much as. in the former cases it was
shown by evidence, that the accident
might have happened by contributory
negligence or some outside influence, over
which the defendant had no control; while
in the case at bar no evidence was given
on the part of the defendant to show how
this accident might have happened or to
relieve himself from the presumption of
negligence. In Lake Shore and Michigan
Southern R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa.
535, Mr. Justice Trunkey said: "If the
plaintiff was knocked down by a blow in
his rear which rendered him unconscious,
it does not follow that because he cannot
tell what struck him that the jury may
not find the fact that his injury was the
direct consequence of a particular act."
The court is of the opinion that from the
peculiar circumstances surrounding the
injury to the plaintiff in this case, that a

duty was cast upon the defendant to explain and rebut the presumption of negligence; having failed to do so, the presumption is that the injury was caused through
the defendant's negligence, or through
some medium over which the defendant
had control, and he is liable in damages.
We therefore direct the jury to render a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
BRENNAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

That the keeper of a store is bound to do
what reasonably can be done, to avoid injury to customers who enter it, is indisputable. So much is conceded by Huey v.
Gahlenbeck, 121 Pa. 238.
It seldom happens that a customer suffers an injury wi: hout some means or cause
being apparent, and it is therefore incumbent on one who thus suffers to show that
the injury was eiLher malicious or negligent. There are cases in which the mere
occurrence of the injury calls on the common carrier to furnish the explanation.
The ultimate reason for thus locating the
burden of disproof of negligence, is the difficulty which the passenger would have
of investigating the causes of his accident,
and exposing any negligence or unskillfulness in suffering these causes to exist.
A similar reason may justify the application of the same rule to others than carriers. If an accident occurs in a store of
such a nature as to preclude a want of care,
on the plaintiff's part, there should be some
cause of it apparent, which is consistent at
least with the care of the defendant. In
the case before us, Given was in Trollope's
store at night. He did no negligent act.
The lights suddenly went out, and during
the minute of perfect darkness, "something was pushed against his legs and he
was thrown to the floor." When the lights
were restored, no cause of the affair was
apparent. Why did the lights go out? By
accident, or with intention? What was
pushed against Given, and who pushed it?
How should he know, any more than the
passenger on a railroad car should know the
causes of a collision? Must he put the defendant and the employes on the stand and
take the risk of eliciting from them evidence of their negligence or malice?
We think the judgment of the court below well supported by the reasons assigned
for it by the learned judge.
Judgment affirmed.
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AMOS BRADLEY,

ADM'R, vS. JACOB

WINSLOW.
Circumstantial evidence-Right of court
to excludefinder's title to lost article.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Joseph Bradley lived in a house on Pine
street, Williamsport, for twenty years,
when he moved out and was succeeded by
Ames, who remained seven years. After
him came Holmes for five years. Holmes
was followed by Winslow, who, shortly
after entering, found $500 in greenbacks
in a closet in a second story. It was
shown that Bradley, who had been dead
for nine years when the assumpsit was
brought by the administrator, had been in
the habit of keeping considerable sums of
money about the house, and never made
deposits in the banks. It was shown that
Holmes had kept a regular bank account,
and that Winslow had said four weeks before, telling a neighbor of his having the
$500, that he had only $250 in cash, which
was in a bank, and that he had $250 on
deposit in a bank. On this evidence plaintiff insisted that the jury should be allowed to say that the money had belonged
to Joseph Bradley.
JAmES and WHITE for plaintiff.
Where a case involves nothing but a
question of fact, it is error to withhold it
rom the jury. Roevers v. Osceola Mills,
169 Pa. 555.
Evidence which alone would justify an
inference of disputed fact in favor of the
party on whom the burden of proof rests,
mustgo to the jury; it is not the province
of court to say whether or not the evidence
does prove such fact. Howard Express
Co. v. Wile, 04 Pa. 201; Egbert v. Page,
99 Pa. 239; Hyatt v. Johnson, 91 Pa. 195;
Lehigh Coal Co. v. Evans, 176 Pa. 28;
Schoeneman v. Well, 3 Superior 119.
The finder of lost money is entitled to it
against anyone except the true owner.
McUardy v. Medum, 11 Allen 548; Wood
v. Pierson, 45 Mich. 313; Armory v. Delaramie, 1 Strange 505; Hamoker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377.
LLOYD and JACOBS for defendant.
In an action to recover personal property the finder must succeed on his superior good title, and not on weakness of defendant's title. Warren's Administrators
v. Ulrich, 130 Pa. 413; Wood v. Pierson,
45 Mich. 313; Hughes v. Pickering, 14 Pa.
297.
It is competent for ajury to find matters
of fact, without direct or positive testimony of those facts. Hughes v. Boyer, 9
Watts 556; Warren v. Ulrich, 130 Pa. 413.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an appeal by the plaintift upon a
non-suit granted in the court below.
The evidence in this case, that the ownership of the money in question, is in Joseph
Bradley is quite weak.
There is no positive proof bearing upon
this point, but there is a chain of circumstances clearly proved and not disputed.
which render it, in a way, probable that
the money in question was hidden in the
closet by Bradley, although this is not a
presumption in any way conclusive within
itself.
Had it been found by Ames, the next
occupant, then it would be reasonable to
presume that the money had been placed
there by Bradley. But it was not found until Bradley had been away forftwelve years.
This gave Bradley three years in which
to discover the money before his death.
The facts plainly show that Ames and
Holmes lay no claim to the money, and
also that Winslow kept a bank account as
well as Holmes.
Of course, this money may have been
that of Ames, although there is no evidence that would allow one to infer such;
and owing to Bradley's aversion to banks,
and his known way of keeping considerable money about the house, it is an inference that the money is his.
This case is quite similar to that of John
Warren's Administrator v. John Ulrich,
cited in 130 Pa. 413, which held that such
facts should be submitted to the jury, with
the exception that in that case the testator
died while living on the premises, while
in this case he did not die for three years
after he removed from the premises.
Such a distinction raises a question as to
whether a reasonable man could put $500
in a closet, move away and not miss his
money within three years. The law raises
a presumption that he will not. And upon
a fact that will raise a presumption at law,
the court must decide and not the jury.
The court recognizes the fact that it is
competent for a jury to find matters of
fact, without direct testimony and upon
circumstantial evidence only, though the
inference or conclusion to be drawn from
the circumstances proved to be absolutely
certain or necessary; and it belongs to the
jury to draw the inferences from the facts
proved. Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556.
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It is well established that where a case
involves nothing but a mere question of
fact, it is error to keep- the same from the
jury. Revere v. Osceola Mills, 169 Pa. 555.
But in this case, as has been stated above,
we have more existing than that.
There is abundance of authority that the
finder of money has the title to it against
all others except the true owner. Hamaker
v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377. In order for the
claimant to recover the money he must
prove his title and ownership. Warren v.
Ulrich, supra.
Hence the court is of the opinion that
the evidence is too weak to go to the jury.
Therefore, we affirm the decree of the
lower court in granting the non-suit.
KEELOR, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
After some reflection we are not convinced that the court below has committed
an error in its disposition of this case. So
far as appears, the $500 might have belonged to one of four persons, Bradley,
Ames, Holmes and Winslow. The money
is in Winslow's hands, but it is shown that
he had said, four weeks before, telling a
neighbor of his "having the $500," that he
had only $250, which was in bank. It also
appears that he had, at that time, $250 in
bank. In four weeks he might well have
obtained$500, otherwise than by findingit,
but the evidence shows that he did find it
in a closet in the house.
Did the money belong to Holmes? He
does not appear as a witness claiming the
fund, nor has he brought an action, or
otherwise asserted an ownership so far as
known. But though his own, he may not
yet have missed the money. Nothing
shows any act of disavowal by him. It
was shown that he kept a regular bank
account. This perhaps makes his ownership of the $500 somewhat improbable, but
only so.
Preceding Holmes in the occupancy of
the house, was Ames, who dwelt in it for
seven years. What reason is there for holding that the money was not his? Whether
he had money, and how, if he had, he was
in the habit of keeping it, we are not infQrmed. He does not appear at all on the
scene. Has he missed the money yet, supposing it to have been his? Why was he
not called for examination by the plaintiff?
So far as we can see, the money may have
been his.

Bradley ceased to occupy the house
twelve years ago. He lived for three years
subsequently. It were strange if he did
not miss the money. Perhaps he did, but
we do not know that he did. The only circumstance that differences his case from
that of Ames, is, that we know nothing of
Ames' manner ofkeepinghis money, while
we know that Bradley was in the habit of
keeping considerable sums in the house,
and never made deposits of it in bank.
What the percentage of men of the class
to which Bradley and Ames belonged,
who eschew banks, as depositaries of
money, is, we do not know, unofficially or
officially. We cannot take judicial notice
of it. Were the percentages shown to be
very small, the improbability that Ames
kept his money in closets would be correspondingly great. The evidence shows that
Bradley may have put the $500 in the
closet, and may have forgotten it for years.
It also shows that Ames may have done
the same. Had it been shown that Ames
was still alive and informed of Winslow's
find, weight could be attached to the nonappearance of a claim by him.
The indications of Bradley's and Ames'
ownership, are too nearly ih equipose to
justify the submission of the question to
the jury. The verdict for Bradley would
be a mere conjecture. Nor does the evidence do more than exclude Holmes' ownership by a slight probability.
In Warren v. Ulrich, 130 Pa. 413, we
find nothing inconsistent with this result.
The court there, after remarking that "the
evidence was undoubtedly weak" of the
ownership of the money, proceeds to say
that it "rendered it extremely probable"
that it was George Warren's. It is somewhat hard to realize how "undoubtedly
weak" evidence can constitute an extreme
probability."
Judgment affirmed.
THOS. LEWIS vs. JNO. KERRY ET. AL.

Fraud-Conveyanceof property by debtor
subsequent to judgment against himBill in equity to set aside the deedRights ofjudgment creditors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Thomas Lewis brought suit before an alderman, on a book account, against John
Kerry. Judgment in favor ofplaintiffand
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against defendant was rendered on June
23, 1899.
On September 28, 1898, after repeated
notices sent by Lewis to Kerry of the
claim, John Kerry and Lizzie Kerry, his
daughter, signed a judgment note payable
to Annie Kerry and Agnes Kerry, daughters of John Kerry, in the sum of $1,200,
payable one day after date. The note was
recorded on April 26, 1899. By deed, dated
April 21, 1899, John Kerry and Mary
Kerry, his wife, sold to Lizzie Kerry, the
joint maker of the note with him, a piece
of property consisting of a house and lot,
the consideration being $1.00. The deed
was recorded on July 3, 1899. On July 11,
1899, the note given by John Kerry and
Lizzie Kerry to Annie Kerry and Agnes
Kerry was satisfied of record, it being alleged that the deeding of the property was
the consideration for the satisfaction of the
note.
Was the conveyance of the property by
John Kerry and Mary Kerry to the
daughter, Lizzie Kerry, fraudulent as
against the creditor, Thomas Lewis? Can
the deed be set aside and the judgment
subsequently given in court on the aldermanic transcript be collected from the
property ?
MCKEEHAN and HOUsER for plaintiff.
If the effect of a conveyance is to hinder
or deprive creditors of the grantor, both
parties having knowledge of the facts, the
conveyance is fraudulent in law. Kepners
v. Berkhart, 5 Pa. 478. The payment of
consideration will not protect a purchaser
if he participated in the fraud. Ashmead
v. Mean, 13 Pa. 583; Zerbe v. Miller, 16
Pa. 488; Bunn v. Ahl, 29 Pa. 387; Renninger v. Spath, 128 Pa. 524. The transfer
of one's property to one's children is a
badge of fraud. Scott v. Hartman, 26 N.
J. Eq., 87; Hoboken Bank v. Beckman,
36 N. J. Eq. 83; Venable v. Bank, 2 Pet.
112.
LONERGAN and PoiNrs for defendant.
Fraud must be established by direct
proof, or by facts to warrant its existence
clearly proved. Jones, Executor of Miles,
v. Lewis, 148 Pa. 234. Fraud is not established by circumstances merely calculated
to excite suspicion. Morton v. Weaver,
99 Pa. 47; Mead v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220;
Satterfield v. Malone, 18 Pa. 35. Business
dealing between parents and children are
not, per se, fraudulent. Reebling v.
Beyer, 94 Pa. 316. Grantee must have
knowledge of the fraudulent intent also.
Collins v. Cronin, 117 Pa. 35; Miller v.
MeCallister, 178 Pa. 540; Page v. Suspender Co., 191 Pa. 511.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

This bill in equity is filed by Lewis,
averring that the conveyance was a fraud
upon him as creditor and praying that the
deed be set aside and the judgment subsequently given in court on the aldermanic
transcript he collected from the property.
Before passing on the question of fraud it
is necessary to consider whether, by making the transfer, Keary became insolvent.
In the first place, there is nothing to oppose
the presumption that he was insolvent.
There is no evidence whatever as to his
ability to pay his "debtor any portion of it
by means other than the property in question. On the contrary, there are strong
circumstances in corroboration of it. If he
had possessed other property. upon which
a levy could have been made, why did
Lewis not levy upon it? Is it not more reasonable to presume that he would have
taken this simple method rather than go
to the trouble and expense of a proceeding
in equity to have the conveyance set aside?
We think the presumption insuperable
that Kerry had no other property than
that conveyed to his daughter Lizzie.
It is in order next to determine, whether
there are any facts in the case which warrant also a presumption of the existence of
fraud. We think there are several such
facts. In the first place, after repeated notices sent to Kerry by his creditor of the
claim, the former, while insolvent, signs a
judgment note. This alone, we think is
sufficient to show fraud. Later he transfers the property to two daughters. This
has been held to be a badge of fraud-Kepner v. Burkhart, 5 Pa. 479. The consideration of this transfer, as stated in the deed,
was $1.00. If, as alleged, the property was
deeded in satisfaction of the judgment,
why did the deed not show on its face a
consideration equal to the amount of the
judgment? Besides this, it was necessary
that the consideration be proved by other
evidence than the mere recital of its receipt
in the deed: Wilson v. Hawser, 12 Pa. 116.
Then too, we think it is hard to conceive
how the deeding of a property to a daughter and joint-maker of the note, could be a
consideration for the satisfaction of the
debt owing to the two other daughters.
Again, the deed, as alleged, was the consideration for the satisfaction of the note.
The deed was made and the note satisfied
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The action was properly brought. The
five -ays before the note was filed. The
note was therefore satisfied before it was conveyance, in the case at bar, was made
filed. We can draw no other conclusion April 21, 1899, and the lien of Lewis' judgthan that the object of filing the note after ment attached nearly three months later.
it was paid was for the purpose of making Lewis made no levy. In such a case
it appear to the other creditor, Lewis, that equity will set aside the fraudulent conthe note was still outstanding and unpaid. veyance at the suit of the creditor Lewis:
I do not mean to say that these circum- Boyle v. Thompson, 1 Chester Co. 117.
stances show conclusively a fraudulent in- This case dispenses with the defendant's
tent on the part of John Kerry to hinder contention that Lewis had an adequate
and delay the plaintiff in collecting his remedy at law and therefore there is no
debt, but since he has failed to explain this jurisdiction in equity. Of like tenor are
evidence in any way consistently with the the decisions in Sheehan v. Gough, 5 Kulp
fairness of the transaction, there is no other 116 and Fowler's Appeal, 87 Pa. 449.
The conveyance of the land by John
conclusion than that the result was brought
Kerry, then, being a fraud upon his credabout by a collusive design.
The defendant, therefore, in relying itor, Thomas Lewis, it is hereby decreed
upon the case of Morton v. Weaver, 99 Pa. that the sale be declared void, and the
land subject to execution for the payment
47, which is authority for the doctrine
that "fraud is not established by circum- of his debts.
STERRETT, J.
stances merely calculated to cause suspiOPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
cion," has not completed his defense.
The evidence of fraud in this case is
The execution of this deed, in the face of
proof of good faith, would be surrounded slight. Kerry might jointly with one
by circumstances calculated to excite more daughter have been indebted to his other
than "suspicion." And in the absence of two daughters, and if he was, it was not
any such proof, we can hardly imagine a fraudulent to confess a judgment to them.
transaction more palpably fraudulent. A creditor alleging the fraud, should furnish some evidence of it. It would be a
The statute of Elizabeth which professes
to invalidate "conveyances made with in- harsh rule that, when a father confesses a
tent to hinder, delay or defraud cred- judgment to a son or daughter, the burden
Itors," would be of little effect indeed if a is on the latter to show that the debt existed
debtor might put his estate beyond the for which it was given. This can often be
reach of creditors in such a manner, and known, only by the parties themselves,
unless we insist that dealings between
then fail to assign any substantial reason
parent and child shall be in the presence
for so doing.
of third persons, and make a judicial statWe think the contention is ruled by
Kaine v. Weigley, 22 Pa. 183-the clearest, ute of frauds additional to the legislative.
The plaintiff could have called as witablest and most exhaustive opinion on
this question we are able to find. Chief nesses, the parties to the note. That
Justice Black there says: "It is not true he did not, was probably because he apthat fraud can never be presumed. Pre- prehended that they would support its
sumptions are of two kinds, legal and honesty. In spite of their desire untruthnatural. Allegations of fraud are some- fully to support it, he might possibly have,
times supported by one and sometimes by by rigid cross examination, shown that
the other, and are seldom, almost never, the payees had had no property; or, delivsustained by that direct and plenary proof ered none to the makers, nor had rendered
which excludes all presumption. A sale services of any sort of which the $1,200 wa.j
of chattels without delivery, or a convey- the compensation.
It being alleged that the conveyance by
ance of land without consideration, is conclusively presumed to be fraudulent as the father to the co-maker of the note, was
against creditors, not only without proof intended to be or to procure a payment of
of any dishonest intent, but in opposition the note, it is somewhat peculiar that the
to the most convincing evidence that the judgment was entered on the note three
motives and objects of the parties are days afterwards. Possibly the payees did
not know of the conveyance for some time.
fair."
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Possibly the grantee was to pay, but had
not, when the note was entered, yet paid
it. There is ground for a suspicion, but as
the plaintiff has not developed by cross-examination or otherwise, the impossibility
of the existence of an explanation consistent with honesty, we hardly think it safe
to set aside the conveyance. Some slight
effort should have been made to show the
inability of the defendant to reveal the
lawfulness of her transaction. While a
wife, receiving ajudgment from the husband has a certain burden of showing that
she had the means to furnish the consideration and probably did furnish it, we are
not aware that it has been held that a
daughter whose age, occupation, possession or want of an estate, are not shown,
restA under a similar burden.
But whether the transaction was fraudulent or not, the remedy was not in equity.
The plaintiff should have levied upon and
sold the land, and then brought ejectment.
Peoples Nat. Bank v. Kern, 193 Pa. 59;
Supplee v. Callaghan, 200 Pa. 146. In no
event should the deed be set aside, for it
was valid between the parties.
Decree reversed.
JOHN ADAIR vs. MATTHEW COLLINS ET AL.
Application to cancel alleged fraudulent
lease-Leasing of property by debtor_Bight of judgment creditor to prevent
his debtorfrom executing lease.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Collins being indebted *to Adair for
$2,400, and intending to prevent Adair's
collection of the debt, made a lease to Jno.
Norris, co-defendant with Collins for 99
years, Norris paying $3,000 for it. The fee
simple was worth forcibly $3,500. A sheriff's sale on Adair's judgment would sacrifice the property, because of the uncertainty of the title. Adair therefore files this
bill to have the facts ascertained and a decree made that Collins intended by the
lease, and that Norris knew when he accepted it, that Collins intended by the
lease to elude Adair's effort to collect the
debt. Norris, however, had an object of
his own, which would have induced him
to take the lease had he not known of Collins' intent. The bill also prayed for a decree that the lease be cancelled.

WINGERT and WILCOX for plaintiff.
A conveyance of land by a debtor with
specific intent to defraud a creditor is void.
P. & L. Digest of Decisions, Vol. 8, Col.
126-31.
When a debtor fraudulently conveys property to avoid creditors, a bill in equity will
lie on the part of his creditors, who have
reduced their claimto judgment lien. Fowler v. Kingsley, 87 Pa. 449; McCallister v.
Marshall, 3 Binney 338; Johnson v. Harvey, 2 P. & W. 82.
SPENCER and WII,LIs for defendants.
Question of title must be determined by

an action of ejectment. Winch's Appeal,
61 Pa. 424; Taylor's Appeal, 8 W. N. C.
192. Court of equity will never interfere
except in cases of irreparable injury. Taylors Appeal, 8 W. N. C. 192; Winch's Appeal, 61 Pa. 424 ; Clark's Appeal, 12 Smith
447; Resser v. Johnson, 26 Smith 313.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant leased for $3,000 the property in question for a term of 99 years. A
judgment had already been obtained by
the plaintiff for $2,400 on the same property. The defendant, in making the lease,
intended to prevent the plaintiff from collecting his debt. The lessee also knew of
the judgment prior to the lease. It is
claimed by the plaintiff, that a sheriff's
sale on the judgment would sacrifice the
property, on account of the uncertainty of
the title; and this bill is filed to restore the
title.
The plaintiff's right to equitable relief
is based upon the fraud alleged to have
been practiced upon the plaintiff, by the
defendant, in leasing the property on
which, he, the plaintiff, had a judgment
lien.
Fraud is one of the chief grounds for
equitable relief. But, from the statement
of facts, no fraud appears to have been
practiced upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff had already reduced his debt against
defendant to a judgment lien against his
property, which, when entered upon the
judgment docket, became constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers, just as
the record of a deed.
"Actual fraud, or fraud in fact, consists
in the intention to prevent creditors from
collecting their just debts by an act which
withdraws the property of a debtor from
their reach." McKibbin-v. Martin, 64 Pa.
356. The defendant in leasing the property was evidently actuated by a fraudulent intent. But he did not succeed in
getting the property out of the reach of
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the plaintiff's judgment, for it was as
much a lien on the property after it was
leased, as before. The Appeal of Fowler,
87 Pa. 449, cited by the plaintiff, is a case
in Decedents' Estates, where the creditor
had not reduced his claim against the decedent to ajudgment during the decedent's
life, and the administrator, it was held.
had a right to the relief of equity to determine the title of the decedent's property. That case differs from this.
The fact that judgments became matters
of record, when entered upon the judgment docket first, as do deeds when recorded, bars the possibility of fraud in the
present case.
The plaintiff, therefore, has an adequate
remedy at law. In Suplenes v. Callaghan,
200 Pa. 147, it was held that "a bill in
equity cannot be maintained by judgment
creditors against their debtor to set aside
a lease made by the debtor alleged to be a
fraud upon the rights of creditors."
The plaintiff's bill is dismissed.
J. M. PHILLIPS. J.
OPINION OP THE SUPREME COURT.

The bill alleges that Collins, intending
to prevent the collection of his debt to
Adair, made the lease for 99 years to Norris.
It does not appear that the consideration
for the lease, $3,000, paid by Norris, was inadequate. Norris, also, had an end of his
own to subserve, which would have induced him to buy the lease, at the price.
He was, however, aware that Collins' intention, in making the lease, was to defraud
Collins' creditors.
A conveyance cannot be treated as null
by creditors of the grantor, merely because
he intended to defraud them. The grantee
must in some way p.articipate in the fraud.
14 Am. & Eng.E ncyc., 270; Bell v. Throop,
140 Pa. 641; Bryan's Appeal, 101 Pa. 389;
8 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 125-126. But no
other participation in it is necessary, than
accepting a conveyance with knowledge
of the intent of the grantor. It would be
inconvenient to adopt a principle which
should compel a nice discrimination between the motives and feelings of the
grantee. Though his act of purchase be
not influenced to any extent, by a desire
to accommodate the fraudulent purpose of
the grantor, it will be fraudulent, if he
knows that it in fact assists the grantor in
effectuating that purpose. Norris is there-
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fore to be deemed a fraudulent grantee.
Zerke v. iMiller, 16 Pa. 488; Renninger v.
Spatz, 128 Pa. 524.
But, if Adair had a lien on the land, at
the time of the conveyance, the conveyance did not impair his right to resort to
it for payment. The law gave him a perfectly adequate remedy, by the prosecution of his lien, and the issue of the appropriate execution. He needs neither the
aid of equity, nor the aid of the theory of
the voidness, as to him, of the conveyance.
Kinnear v. Gealy, 1 Penny. 284; Haak's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 59; 8 P. & L. Dig. Decisions, 12637.
For some reason, unsupported by the
evidence, the learned court below has assumed that Adair had received ajudgment,
before the making of the lease to Norris.
If we may infer that Adair now has a
judgment, we have no reason to believe
that it was in existence at the time of the
transaction with Norris. The party who
wishes to gain an advantage from its existence then ought to have proven it. We
must assume that the lease was fraudulent as respects Adair.
The only question is, what is Adair's
proper remedy. The defrauded creditors'
usual remedy in Pennsylvania is that of
(a) obtaining a judgment for the debt; (b)
issuing an execution and selling the land
as if it were still the debtor's. The purchaser at the sheriff's sale, if the fraudulent grantee remains in possession, must
then bring ejectment, wherein, on proving
the fraud, he will entitle himself to a recovery. Taylor's Appeal, 93 Pa. 21. A
bill in equity, 'praying for an injunction to
restrain the grantee from conveying the
land, pending an execution and a levy on
the land by the creditor, was dismissed, in
Girard National Bank's Appeal, 13 W. N.
0. 101.
Although it is said that this remedy is
adequate, it fails to accomplish certain desirable results. The conveyance from the
fraudulent grantee to a bonafide purchaser,
would prescind the defrauded creditors'
right of pursuit. Should there not be a
remedy by injunction, to prevent this conveyance? In Girard Nat. Bank's Appeal,
13 W. N. C. 101, the plaintiff had already
issued an execution, and levied on the
land. Thayer, P. J., assumes that this
levy gave him a lien, that wrould prevail
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against a subsequent purchaser, so that the
injunction was not necessarv.
When the creditor is compelled to sell
thefraudulently conveyed land,the bidders
at the sheriff's sale know that there is a
serious cloud upon the title. Whether
the purchaser will obtain an ownership,
depends on his ability to convince some
future jury,'that there was fraud in the
sale. How can he have any certainty as
to this ability, however clear, to his own
mind, the fact of fraud? The consequence
is that the land will be ruinously sacrificed. He must buy himself, or suffer the
probable loss of a large part of his debt. If
there are. several defrauded creditors, and
they do not combine to buy jointly, one or
more will be injured. It is suggested, in
Girard Nat. Bank's Appeal, 13 W. N. C.
101, that a bill of delivery might be filed
in aid of an execution. This doubtless
would assist in securing evidence, but
would not decide the status of the title.
A partial recognition of the need of equitable relief was made in Fowler's Appeal,
87 Pa. 449. The debtor having fraudulently conveyed his land, had died. The
creditor then filed a bill, asking that the
grantee might be restrained from conveying the land, and that the grant to him
might be declared fraudulent. Objection
to the bill that the plaintiff had obtained
no judgment, prevailed with the court below, which dismissed it. In reversing,
the Supreme Court .pointed out that the
law made debts liens without judgment.
The writer of the opinion seems to have
thought, at the moment, that equity insisted on a judgment because it is a lien.
and not because it is an adjudication at law
upon the alleged debt. It is entirely clear
that when the law makes debts liens, it
does not determine that X's alleged debt
is a debt, and that it still remains for the
court of equity to decide whether it is a
debt or n6t. Cf. Houseman v. Grossman,
177 Pa. 453.
Equity then, can determine whether the
plaintiff is a creditor. rt has jurisdiction
also to determine whether the conveyance
was made by the debtor, with an intent to
defraud creditors.
Fowler's Appeal, 87
Pa. 449; Pe9ple's Nat. Bank v. Loeffert,
184 Pa. 164. If equity cannot decree the
conveyance void, in aid of an execution,
it is not because it cannot determine the

existence of the facts which make it void,
a debt, an intention to defraud it, a conveyance in execution of that intention. It
must be because these facts can be as well
ascertained at law.
It was thought in Boyle v. Thomas, 1
Chest. 117, that they could not be so effectively ascertained at law. The view approved by the Supreme Court, however, is
that the remedy by execution sale and
ejectment is adequate. People's National
Bank v. Kern, 193 Pa. 59; Supplee v. Callaghan, 200 Pa. 146. The hill does not
aver that there is danger that the fraudulent grantee will convey the land to a bona
fide purchaser before an execution could
issue and a levy be made. It presents no
facts from which it might appear that the
plaintiff cannot as well secure his debt in
the ordinary way, as by procuring a decree
in equity. It does not pray that the lease
be cancelled, a redress to which, in no
event, is the creditor entitled, since the
lease, however fraudulent the intent with
which it was made, is valid as between the
parties.
Appeal dismissed.
WHEELER vs. MARSH.
Promissorynote-farriedwomen, contractof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On March 18, 1899, Mrs. Marsh and husband executed the following note:
$70.00.
PITTSTON, PA., March 18, 1899.
One day after date we promise to pay
to Chesworth Bros., or bearer, seventy
dollars with interest, and without defalcation for value received ; and we do hereby
confess judgment for the aforesaid sum,
with interest, costs of suit, with 5 per cent
attorney's fee if collected by legal process,
releasing all errors, waiving inquisition,
confessing condemnation without stay of
execution, and with waiver of all exemption and stay laws of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.
Mis. M. R. MARsH. [L. s.]
MoRGAx R. MARSH. [L. S.]
Due March 19, 1899.
On September 20th the above note was
properly assigned to Hugh Chesworth,
who assigned it to the plaintiff. The note
having been entered of record, Mrs. Marsh
has a motion made to strike off the judgment, alleging that such a note is not valid
against a married woman.
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act, were necessary to the judgment's validity"-per Sterrett, J., in Adams v.
Grey, supra. "If she claims protection of
condition of marriage, she must show
affirmatively not only the fact of marriage,
but presence of circumstances that will relieve l4er from liability." Stahr v. Brewer,
186 Pa. 625; Jester v. Hine, 2 D. R. 690.
In Kochling v. Henkle, 144 Pa. 215, it was
LouRImER and WILCOX for defendant,
held that a married woman may confess
cited 174 Pa. 111; 132 Pa. 496; 194 Pa. 141; judgment whenever, by her contract, she
165 Pa. 526.
may subject herself to be sued. So that,
OPINION OF THE COURT.
if Mrs. Marsh had power to contract here,
At common law, a confession of judg- she had power to confess judgment.
ment by a married woman was void, beA motion to set aside ajudgment against
cause of her inability to make contracts ; a married woman, or to strike off such
but, by legislation in Pennsylvania, be- judgment, must be on the ground of irregginning in 1848, the rights of a married
ularity appearing on the face of the recwoman have been enlarged and extended,
ord. Stahr v. Brewster, supra; Kochling
until, by the Act of June 8, 1893, she was v. Henkle, supra.
given, with a few exceptions, the same
And what have we in the casebefore us?
contractual capacity, except that she can- Mrs. Marsh does not offer to show that
not be as an unmarried woman. Among
this contract was void as to her because it
the exceptions are surety contracts and was within one of the exceptions of the
contracts of guaranty. Neither can she Act of 1893. She does not offer any eviexecute a deed, unless her husband joins dence that her husband received the monin the deed. The Actof June 3,1887, had ey for which the note was given, therefore,
enlarged and extended her power to con- this case is distinguished from Real Estate
tract to the extent of (1) those made in Investment Co. v.Roop,132Pa.496. There,
management of her separate estate, (2) for a note was made by a husband and wife
necessaries, (3) in carrying on a trade or confessing judgment, but testimony was
business. This act was supplanted by adduced to show that the money procured
that of 1893. These acts changed the pre- by it was used by the husband. Mrs.
sumption, and consequently the burden of Marsh here merely gives in evidence the
proof. Before their enactment, the ca- note, and claims that it is void as to her pacity of a married woman to contract
she offers no facts to support that claim.
was exceptional, and her disability genThere is nothing on the face of the note
eral; now the disability is exceptional, and that indicates that she signed it as surety,
the ability general. The burden is upon guarantor or endorser for her husband.
her, when she seeks to avoid the contract,
The note is joint, in the plural number,
to bring it within one of the few excep- signed by her and her husband, she signtions created by the Act of June 8, 1893.
ing first. This, without any further eviPatrick v. Smith, 165 Pa. 126. Since the dence, is insufficient to show that it was a
passage of the Act of 1887, a married wo- surety contract.
man's contract is presumably valid, and
Therefore, in view of the decisions cited
not presumably void, as before that act. above, we are of the opinion that this was
Reed v. Smith, 25 Cty. Ct. 599; Abel v. a valid contract of Mrs. Marsh, and that
Chaffee, 154 Pa. 254; Adams v. Grey, 154 her defence to the judgment is without
Pa. 258; Kochling v. Henkle, 144 Pa. 215. merit. Motion refused.
SCHANZ, J.
In the last case it is said: "We cannot say
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
that a judgment confessed by a married
The note sued upon is signed by Mrs. M.
woman is void. At most, itis only voidable, and it may be set aside upon applica- R. Marsh, and below her name by her hustion when it is made to appear that she is band. A seal is affixed to both names. If
not authorized by the act." "It is no from the form of the execution, any presumption could be made as to the status
longer necessary to such validity to set out
on the record the facts which, before the of the signers as principal or surety, it
LANARD and SHomo for plaintiff.

Judgment confessed by a married woman will be set aside only when it appears
that it was given for a debt for which she
was not liable. Adams v. Gray, 154 Pa.
258.
Judgment must stand unless defendant
signed the instrument on which it is
founded as surety. Act of June 3, 1887
Act of June 8, 1893; 186 Pa. 623.
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would be that Mrs. Marsh was principal,
and that her husband was either a co-principal or a surety.
It is unnecessary to cite authority for the
power of a married woman to make a
promise to pay money, sealed or unsealed.
And, if she has this power, she has the
further power of confessing judgment for
the sum, payment of which she promises.
Real Estate Co. v. Roop, 132 Pa. 496;
Kochling v. Henkle, 144 Pa. 215; Jacquett
v. Allabaugh, 16 Super. 557; McCrea v.
Sisler, 17 Super. 175.
Mrs. Marsh asks the court to strike off the
judgment which has been entered in conformity with the warrant of attorney,
alleging vaguely, however, as reason, that
I"such a note is not valid against a married
woman."
"Such a note." What are the qualities
indicated by the word"such?"
Thenote
is payable to "Chesworth Bros. or bearer."
The note was made March 18th, 1899. It
was not therefore negotiable. But neither
the sex nor the married or unmarried state
of the maker has any bearing on the negotiable quality of the note, or on the construction to be placed on it. The words
"or bearer" in the note, are simply to be
neglected as surplusage. They would have
made the note negotiable, and in fact payable to bearer, but for the seal, for the 5
per cent commission clause, and for the
warrant of attorney to confess judgment.
The presence of any one of these properties,
prevents the note's beirig negotiable. It is
to be read, therefore, as a promise to pay
the "Chesworth Bros."
It is not alleged that the note was given
by Mrs. Marsh as surety or guarantee, or
otherwise for accommodation, and it is not
to be presumed that it was so given. We
see no reason for striking off the judgment.
Order of the Court below affirmed.

GREGORY vs. PORTER.
Ejectment--Bescission of written contract
to purchase lands by parol-Statute of
frauds.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Porter contracted in writing to sell a
piece of land to Gregory for $2,000, and
Gregory took possession and erected a
house on it at a cost of $2,140. After being
on it for four years, Gregory orally agreed

to give up his right for $2,500. He had
already paid $300 on the contract, but had
becomeembarrassed. Porter gave Gregory
a bond for the $2,500, payable in ten yearly
installments. After paying two installments, he omitted to pay anything for two
years, when Gregory demanded possession
of the land, and declared his intentions to
insist on the original contract, which he
had retained.
He therefore brings this ejectment.
ScHANz for plaintiff.
The new contract entered into by Gregory with Porter was not a rescission of
the first contract. Cavener v. Bowser, 4
Pa. 259: Goucher v. Martin, 9 Watts 106.
A written contract for the purchase of
land, partly executed by the entry and
long possession of, and improvements
made by, the vendee, cannot be rescinded
by a verbal agreement. Lawer v. Lee, 42
Pa. 165; Bouser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132.
WRIGHT and KEFon for defendant.
Proof of a parol contract for the sale of
lands, delivery of possession, part payment
of the purchase money, are sufficient to
take a case out of the Statute of Frauds.
Milliken v. Draw, 67 Pa. 230; Richards v.
Ellwell, 12 Wright 361; Lloyd's Appeal,
82 Pa. 486..
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Ejectment is a proper action on failure
to pay the installments in the bond. Bantleon v. Smith, 2 Binn. 152; McCall v.
Lenox, 9 S. & R. 304; Fluck v. Replogle,
13 Pa. 406. "Where a vendor oflands has
taken bonds for the purchase money, if
there is no receipt endorsed for the purchase money, or proof that they were accepted as actual payment, and he keeps
possession of the title papers, the lien continues on the land, as between vendor and
vendee, and those claiming under the latter with notice." Stauffer v. Coleman, I
Yeates 393.
Porter's sale of the property to Gregor 7
gave Gregory such title to the land as to
enable him to convey it back to Porter.
The Statute of Frauds provides: "That no
estate or interest in land shall pass but by
deed, or some instrument in writing,
signed by the parties; and it is Immaterial
whether the interest be legal or equitable,
as an equitable interest is an interest in
land which comes within the words and
spirit of the Statute of Frauds."
Can Gregory's orally agreeing to give up
his right for $2,500 be considered a rescission of the written agreement or the making of a new one?
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While a written contract can be rescinded by a parol agreement-Boyce v.
McCulloch, 3 W. & S. 429; Brownsfield
Ex'rs v. Brownsfield, 151 Pa. 565; yet, as
in Goucher v. Martin, 9 Watts 111, where
the facts were very similar to those in this
case, Justice Rogers says: " But where the
(written) contract is in part executed,.and
the party becomes seised of an estate in
the land, I hold it to be a very clear proposition, that he cannot be deprived of his
estate, on the pretext that the agreement
had been waived by a parol contract. *
* * * But here the point does not arise,
for there Is no proof whatever of any
waiver of the original bargain, but the
case is presented on the fact of a contract
of sale, and a repurchase of the land on
different terms and conditions from the
original agreement." To the same effect
is Cravener v. Bowser, 4 Pa. 459, which
holds that, "a written contract for the purchase of land, in part executed by entry
and improvements made, cannot be rescinded by a verbal agreement and surrender of the instrument." But in the present case, there was no surrender of the
instrument, but an avowal to enforce it
after the breach in the parol contract,
which is consistent with an intention that
the written contract should remain in
force.
Now, whether the parol agreement be
considered a new contract or a rescission
of the written contract, its effectiveness
depended upon the condition in the bond,
liz: the payment in regular, yearly installments of the $2,500. Two of these
payments having been made, and there
being a failure to pay for two subsequent
years, there was such a breach as entitled
Gregory to repossess himself again of the
premises, and this without tendering a return of the money paid or offering the title
deeds since he was proceeding in his legal
title of vendor, and not asking specific
performance of the parol agreement. Irwin v. Bleakley, 67 Pa. 24.
WELSH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Gregory under a written contract of purchase, took possession of the land, and
erected a house on it for $2,140. Having,
in four years, paid only $300 on the contract and being unable to continue to make
payments, he orally agreed to give up his
contract to Porter, for $2,500. Porter ac-

cepted the offer, took possession of the
premises and executed a bond for the $2,500
payable in ten annual installments. Two
years have since elapsed, and two installments; of this bond have become due, but
remain unpaid.
Can Gregory recover, as vendee under
the original contract? That he cannot is
alleged, because that contract has been rescinded. It was in writing, possession vas
taken under it; partial payments were
made upon it; improvements were put on
the premises. These facts, severally, or
together, present no obstacle to an oral rescission, if the possession is given up, as it
was by Gregory. Brownfield v. Brownfield, 151 Pa. 565; McClure v. Jones, 121
Pa. 550; Boyce v. McCulloch, 3 W. & S.
429.
Had the contract not been rescinded, by
agreement, we think that under the facts
proven, Gregory could not recover possession, until he paid the residue of the purchase money. He agreed to pay $2,140.
He in fact paid but $300, although four
years had elapsed at the time of the oral
contract to rescind. Two more years have
elapsed.
The possession was taken by
Porter not wrongfully, but with the consent of Gregory. Although the rents of
the premises must be applied to the interest and principal of the contract price, and
for this reason, Gregory not knowing how
much to tender, could maintain the action,
his recovery must be conditioned on his
paying the unpaid purchase money. This
has not been ascertained, nor has the payment of it been required by the judgment
of the court, as a preliminary to execution.
The contract has, however, been rescinded. The price of the surrender of
Gregory's interest, was $2,500, tobe paid
in ten installments, and none of it has been
paid. Does this neglect of Porter to pay
the consideration for the surrender, entitle
Gregory to rescind it, and to retake possession? When the owner of a legal title
contracts to convey, and the vendee fails
to comply with the contract, the former
may rescind, and recover the possession,
but that is because he retains the legal
title. He has not yet conveyed. After
the conveyance, the vendor cannot recover
in ejectment, because of the failure to pay
the purchase money.
When Gregory
orally agreed to give up his equity, he did
not contemplate any further assurance
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He yielded the possession to Porter, and
nothing further was to be done, in order to
revest Porter with the full estate. Gregory could not rescind, as a vendor of an
estate in land can rescind, because a vendor recovers on some retained estate.
Gregory's agreement had caused his equity
to coalesce with Porter's legal title, And he
had no longer any sort of an estate, legal
or equitable, in virtue of which he could
sustain an ejectment.
But, Gregory had received a bond for
$2,500, and this bond remains unpaid.
Ejectment cannot be brought to compel the
payment of purchase money, when the
plaintiff has no title to the land, and only
a title to the money. Megargel v. Saul, 3
Wh. 19; Krebs v. Stroub, 116 Pa. 405. The
remedy is upon the bond, whereon when
judgment is recovered, the land in question and any other property of Porter,
may be levied upon in execution. Should
the land have been then encumbered or
aliened, it will be Gregory's misfortune
that he did not earlier secure a lien, or in
some way condition his surrender. Simply
reserving a claim for money, does not
make a lien on, nor condition the surrender
of, the equity.
The conclusion we have reached
differs from that of the learned court
below. We think that Gregory cannot
maintain ejectment as vendee, under the
original contract, (a) because Porter having gained rightful possession, is entitled
to keep it until Gregory shall pay the purchase money; (b) because the contract has
been extinguished by the later agreement.
We think that Gregory cannot recover in
ejectment in consequence of the breach of
the later agreement; (c) because he has retained no estate in the land and he has
subjected his release of his equity therein
to no condition, which entitles him to the
possession, but only a right as obligee, to
$2,500, and this right must be vindicated
by assumpsit, and not by ejectment.
Judgment reversed.

goods business. Cassat, without the knowledge of Jones, confessed a judgment to
Nice for $1.600 (the price of goods purchased) against the firm, Cassat and Jones,
trading as Jones & Co. Boyd, another
creditor of the firm, obtained a confession
for $2,000' by both partners. Execution
was issued on both judgments, reaching
the hands of the sheriff at the same time.
A levy was made under both on the firm
assets, and also the personal property of
the partners. The firm goods were sold,
the net proceeds being $2,640. The owner
of the second judgment denied the right
of Nice to compete with him in the distribution: (a) because Nice's judgment was
confessed by only one partner; (b) because
it was $200 too much. He tendered evidenceas to the last point, but the auditor
declined to hear it. He distributed fund
pro ratabetween Nice and Boyd. Exceptions taken by Boyd.
CLAYCOmB and WRIGHT for appellant.
Judgment entered on. note given by one
partner without knowledge of co-partners
may be set aside as to them, in a collateral
proceeding before an auditor, as a fraud
upon creditors. McLaughlin's Appeal,
111 Pa. 551.
It is error to direct a verdict if eviderlce
rejected would have presented a material
question of fact for a jury. Shank v.
Simpson, 119 Pa. 208. One partner cannot
confess judgment against another partner,
even for a partnership debt. Grier v.
Hood. 25 Pa. 430.
ScHANZ and DRUMHELLER for appellee.
A judgment confessed by one partner for
partnership debt binds the other partners.
Harper v. Fox, 7 W. & S. 142; Taylor v.
Henderson, 17 S. & R. 456; Boyd v. Thompson & Coxe, 153 Pa. 83"; McLeary v.
Thompson, 130 Pa. 443. Other creditors
may not offer objections to such a judgment. Grier v. Hood, 25 Pa. 430. The
auditor was correct in refusing to hedr
evidence that Cassat had confessed $200
too much. Hopkins v. West, 83 Pa. 109 ;
Ernest v. Hoskins, 100 Pa. 551; Bradder
v. Brownfield, 4 Watts 474; Hageman v.
Salisbury, 74 Pa. 280.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There are two exceptions to the auditor's
report. We shall dispose of each point
Partnership-Confessionof judgment by
separately. (a). Can one partner confess
one partner in firm name binds firm-Prorata distribution of assets-Fraud a judgment against the firm in the usual
course of the film business? this we must.
may vittate claim.
answer in the affirmative. It has been
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
settled by a long line of cases that a judgCassat and Jones were partners in a dry
ment confessed by one partner in the firm
NICE vs. CASSAT E-T AL.
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name, for a partnership debt, is good
against the partner confessing, and that
the partnership's property may be sold
under an execution on such judgment.
Winship v. Bank, 5 Peters 561; Purviance
v. Bank, 6 S. & R. 259.
There is another line of cases, among
which is Schmertz v. Shreeve, 62 Pa. 457,
holding that one partner cannot bind his
co-partners or his firm by a deed or other
instrument under seal, by virtue of his implied power as a member of the firm to
represent it. But these two lines of cases
may be reconciled when the distinctions
between executed and executory instruments are drawn. Those cases which hold
that a partner cannot bind his partners by
a deed or other instruments under seal,
only apply to executory contracts, under
seal. The reason for this is, because a seal
imparts a consideration, and it prevents
the running of the statute of limitations,
applicable to the case of a simple contract.
Justice Strong, in Dubois' Appeal, 38 Pa.
231, said: "The partnership relation will
not authorize one partner to execute an instrument under seal, whereby a new and
original obligatidn is imposed upon the
firm. He cannot charge the firm, but he
may discharge it.' But in cases of executory istruments, all cases are in harmony that one partner can confess judgment for a partnership debt. The seal is
unnecessary upon such an instrument,
and its presence neither adds nor modifies,
in any measure, its legal effect.
In the case before us, the firm appears to
consist of two members. One of these
confessed a judgment to Nice for $1,600
against the firm, "the price for goods purchased." The goods were purchased for
the firm, and in the "usualcourse of the
business, so far as it appears. The debt is
not denied by either of the partners. He
discharged a debt of the firm, which had
already been in existence. So we can see
no objection to the first judgment on the
ground that only one partner confessed it.
Royd v. Thompson, 153 Pa. 78; Adams v.
James, 195 Pa. 70; Rose v. Howell, 84 Pa.
129.
We will now dispose of the second point,
(b). Boyd tendered evidence to show,
that the ju4gment of Nice was for $200 too
much, and the auditor declined to hear it.
The only question which presents itself is,
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could this judgment be attacked collaterally? If it could, the auditor ought to
have heard the evidence, and if it could
not, he was right in rejecting it.
It has been settled by a long line of
authority that, in the distribution of a
fund, an auditor can not inquire into the
validity of a judgment regular on its face.
But he may receive testimony to show
that since its rendition, the judgment has
been paid or otherwise satisfied.
It is also well settled, that the mere fact,
that the debtor has been defrauded by the
creditor, gives no right to other creditors
to attack the judgment collaterally. So
long as it stands as a valid judgment
against the defendant it is good against
them. They have no right to complain of
a fraud upon him.
When, however, judgment has been
fraudulently given by collusion between
the debtor and the plaintiff, such judgments for the purpose of hindering and
delaying creditors, may be attacked collaterally by the creditors intended to be
defrauded. A question may now arise as
to what incidents would constitute fraud
that it may justify an attack.
Justice Sharswood in Clark v. Douglass, 62 Pa. 408, said: "A judgment confessed voluntarily by one indebted, or insolvent, for more than is due, is prima
facie fraudulent within the statute of 13
Eliz." So we learn from this ease, that the
mere fact that a judgment was given for
more than is due, is prima facie fraud,
until this presumption is rebutted, of
course, assuming, that he who gave the
judgment was indebted or insolvent.
Now let us consider the case at bar.
"The judgment was given for $1,600, the
price for goods purchased." Boyd claimed
that the judgment was for $200 too much,
and he tendered evidence to prove the
same. The learned counsel for the respondent contends, that no offer to show
fraud has been made, and therefor the
auditor was right in not allowing the
judgment to be attacked.
But a question will still remain. How
shall we dispose of the $200 more? The
judgment is for $200 too much, and we are
not Informed as to the purpose for which
it was given.
Of course, we may presume that the $200
might have been legal interest, as'the time
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since the purchasing of the goods to the
time of confessing the judgment does not
appear. Or even if the judgment followed
shortly after the purchasing of the goods,
and the $200 was given as usury, we would
also be justified in presuming that it was
given iu good faith, and when it is given
in good faith, it does not constitute fraud
on creditors.
But, here we have his statement, that
the judgment is for $200 too much, and he
offered evidence to show the same. And
if the evidence would have been heard,
fraud might have been established though
he does not allege fraud in his statement,
the statement itself raises prima facie
fraud, until it is rebutted.
From the whole of the case, it is clear,
that the firm was indebted or even insolvent at the time when the judgment
was given.
It is reasonable to presume that both
debts to Nice and to Boyd were in existence before the judgment was confessed to
Nice. And if so, the law which is laid
down in Clarkv. Douglass would apply to
this case. Does the debtor or the plaintiff
of that judgment rebut the presumption ?
Do they explain before the auditor for
what purpose the $200 was given ? They
do not, so far as it appears.
Boyd is a stranger to the judgment, and
he could nob very well attack it directly.
Chief Justice Gibson, in Dougherty's Estate, 9 W. & S. ]96, said: "But if the judgment were collusive they might abate collaterally, and though they have sometimes
been allowed to intervene directly, such
practice is irregular."
It would shock the common sense of
every intelligent man for any court to leave
the innocent lose and the guilty gain.
Why not give an opportunity to hear the
evidence and determine whether fraud was
intended by giving the $200 more. If
fraud should be proved, the judgment
would be void as to the other creditors.
McKly's Appeal, 102 Pa. 536; Clark v.
Douglass, 62 Pa. 408; Henderson v. Ward,
96 Pa. 460; Appeal of Second National
Bank, 85 Pa. 528; Numan v. Kopp, 5 Binney 74. We may also cite the Am. &Eng.
Encyc. of Law, Vol. 12, page 148: "Judgments in personam bind only the parties
and prurio, and therefore third parties
may impeach such judgments collater-

ally." The judgment which was given to
Nice was a judgment in personam, and
could, therefore, be attacked even for an
error. And if the offer on the part of Boyd
to show that it was for $200 too much, does
not establish prima facie fraud, it surely
does establish error until It is rebutted.
We, therefore, refer the account back to
the auditor, with the direction that he hear
the testimony on both sides.
KAUFMAN, 3.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The two questions presented by this case
have been rightly decided by the learned
court below. One partner may confes&, in
the name of the firm, a judgment upon
which its property can be sold, and which
may be paid from the proceeds of such
sale. Boyd v. Thompson, 1.53 Pa. 78; McCleary v. Thompson, 130 Pa. 443.
The fact that Boyd's judgment was
entered upon a confession by both partners
gives him no superiority to Nice, as respects the firm assets.
The executions came to the sheriff at the
same time. They are, therefore, liens of
equal rank, and as the fund is only $2,640,
while the two debts are $3,600, they must
share in itpro rata.
The Nice judgment is alleged by Boyd
to be $200 more than was really due. If
this excess is the result of usury, and the
usury was not contracted for with the purpose of defrauding Boyd, he cannot reduce
the judgment; 8 P. & L. Dig. 12735. The
allegation of Boyd is, however, sufficient
to require an investigation, and the court
has properly recommitted to the auditor
his report with a direction that he hear
and consider the evidence which may be
tendered with respect to this matter. The
appeal is from an interlocutory order of the
court, and premature.
Appeal dismissed.
SUMMERS vs. NATIONAL BANK.
Bank's liability to depositor- Forged
checks-Negligence of depositor no excuse for bank.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Summers was a depositor in the defendant bank. He drew out his Toney from
time to time on checks by the hand of a
confidential clerk. This clerk forged seven
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checks, for $400, $100, $300, $250, $500, $600
and $200, over a course of eighteen months.
was balanced five
The depositor's bk
times in this period, the checks genuine
and forged being returned by the hand of
this clerk, who suppressed the forged
checks and altered the books of Summers
so as to prevent his discovering the fraud.
Had Summers carefully examined the
book he would have discovered the fraud.
The bank officers made no examination of
the checksassuming from their knowledge
of the clerk that all was right. The last
two checks were paid just before the last
return of the checks and balancing of the
book, and immediately after Summers
found out the fraud and demanded from
the bank the $2,350. The bank refused to
pay any of it, because of the lapse of time
since it had paid the check preceding the
last two, which was two months, and because it had been deceived by Summers'
confidential clerk.
ALBERTSON and DONAHOE for the plaintiff.
A bank is liable if it pays a forged check.
People's Saving Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 315;
Weisser v. Denison, 10 N. Y 68; Mackintosh v. Nat. Bank, 123 Mass. 393; Frank v.
Chemical Bank, 84 N. Y. 209.
A balance bank book is but an account
stated. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343;
Weisser v. Denison, supra; 1 Story Eq.
Jures., Sect. 523, 528, 529.
Mere lapse of time does not bar allegation of forgery, if done within reasonable
time. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1
Hill, (N. Y.) 287; Weisser v. Denison,
gegligence of depositor does not excuse
bank's negligence. Myers v. Bank, 193
Pa. 1; Leather Mfg. Co. v. Morgan, 117
U. S. 112; Cupp v. Bank, 91 Pa. 315.
HILLYER and PEIGHTEL for defendant.
A failure by depositor to compare returned checks with accounts prevents his
disputing bank's credits. Leather Mfg.
Co. v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96; United Security Co. v. Central Nat. Bank, 185 Pa.
586- Myers v. Bank, 193 Pa. 1.
Raving delegated authority to agent,
depositor becomes responsible for his omission orcommission. Gunsterv. Illumination Co., 181 Pa. 327; Myers v. Bank, 1.3
Pa. 1.
Failure to notify bank of forgery within
reasonable time estopps the depositor from
recovery. Morgan v. R. R. Co., 96 U. S.
716; Leather Mfg. Co. v. Morgan, supra.
OPIION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff's case may be considered1st, as to those checks which were paid
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prior to, and at the time of the fourth balancing of the bank book and its delivery to
the plaintiffis clerk, embracing the following forgeries: Checks for $400, $100, $300,
$250 and $500.
And 2nd, as to the checks afterwards
presented and paid, viz., one for $600 and
one for $200, as shown at the fifth balancing of the bank book.
As to the first class of checks. It has
been stated that the plaintiff had in his
employ a confidential clerk, who received
the checks from the bank together with
the bank book, showing entries for the
amounts now claimed. During this period,
extending over a year, the bank book had
been balanced four times, presented to
plaintiffs clerk, and no notice ever given
the bank of errors or improper credits.
"In contemplation of law the delivery
of the checks and bank book to the plaintiff's clerk acting in the scope. of his authorit.v, was a delivery by the bank to the
plaintiff himself." 193 Pa. 12; 185 Pa. 586;
117 U. S. 115.
It is the duty and well established custom of every banking institution, that
after checks have been drawn upon it purporting to be issued by a depositor, to deliver the checks to the depositor as vouchers in its account, in order that the credits
entered upon its books may be allowed by
the depositor. Upon such presentation, it
is his duty to examine and accept or reject the signatures, and to return the rejected checks within a reasonabletime. A
failure on the part of the depositor to do
this prevents him from disputing the
bank's credit on account of the checks.
117 U. S. 96; 185 Pa. 586; 17 Mass. 44.
There is nothing in this case to show that
the plaintiff did not have an opportunity
to examine the accounts as presented by
the bank. He failed to exercise reasonable
diligence in supervising the conduct of his
clerk while the latter was in his employ.
We think the plaintiff was negligent in
not examining the accounts, and promptly
notifying the bank. If he had carefully examined the book at any of the times at
which it was balanced he would have discovered the fraud. This he did not do as
he relied too muph upon the honesty ofhis
clerk, which fact will not now assist him
to recover. We fail to find in this case
any negligence on the part of the bank.
It is alleged by the plaintiff, that the bank

22

THE FORUM

officers made no examination of the checks.
We do not think that the facts will warrant the inference that the checks were
paid without even looking at the signatures. While the paying officer of the
bank did not examine the signature with
the same scrutiny that would be required
of him were the checks presented by a
stranger, yet under the circumstances in
this case, knowing the clerk and having a
knowledge of the relation existing between
him and his employer, the plaintiff, we
are of the opinion that the bank exercised
all the care required of it. It is not the
bank's fault that the forgeries in this
case were not promptly discovered by the
plaintiff and notice thereof given. The
plaintiff should have performed his duty
to the bank at the proper time. Not having done so, we are clearly of the opinion
that he cannot now recover the amount
of the checks enumerated in the first class,
viz: $1,550.
As to the second class of checks. It appears that the last two checks were paid
just before the last return of the checks
and balancing of the bank book, and immediately afterwards Summers found out
the fraud and made demand upon the
bank.
It has been argued by counsel for plaintiff, that sufficient notice of fraud was
given and within the proper time, to recover on these two cheeks, amounting to
$800, paid prior to the last settlement.
When a bank pays a check purporting to
bear the signature of its depositor, it does
so at its own risk. This risk and liability
continues until the account is rendered by
the bank, and a reasonable time thereafter
allowed the depositor to either accept or
reject the account or any part of it. This
acceptance by the depositor may be inferred from silence or his failure to notify
the bank within a reasonable time. What
is a reasonable time? It is held in the
case of Glouster Bank v. Salem Bank, 17
Mass. 44: "That when a check is paid by
a bank purporting to be genuine, and if
afterwards found ofit to be spurious, nothing short of immediate notice to the bank,
and demand of its payment will suffice to
maintain an action for the money." The
coursaid: "There must be some limitation
to the right in point of time, and the true
rule is, that, the party receiving such
-checks must examine as soon as he has an

opportunity and return them immediately;
if he does not, he is negligent, and negligence will defeat his right of action."
The plaintiff gave immediate notice
upon discovering those two forged checks,
presented at the fifth settlement, and demanded payment. He did all that was
expected of him under the law and no
negligence can be attributed to him in regard to those two items. An examination
of the adjudicated cases leads us to the
conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover the amount of the last two checks.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor
of the plaintiff for $800.
BRENNAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMIE COURT.

A bank has authority to pay otit its depositor's money only on his check. When
a check purporting to be his, is presented,
it must, at its peril, ascertain that such
check is genuine. Should it in fact not be
genuine, a payment of it will entitle the
bank to no credit against the depositor's
account.
Nor can it be admitted that the fact that
the confidential clerk of the depositor is
the forger will justify the bank's payment,
even though it makes careful effort to discover whether the check is genuine, and,
in consequence, concludes that the check
is genuine.
The first of the forged checks was for
$400. Though the bank paid it, it remained liable to Summers. This liability
continued the next day and the next week.
After an interval, we know not how long,
the bank wrote up the depositor's passbook and returned it with the check to his
clerk. Itis not suggested that, down to
this time, the bank was entitled to credit,
as against Summers, for the payment.
Indeed, he was not entitled.
But, it is supposed that by some later
event the bank, which hitherto had been
bound to make good the $400 to Summers,
slipped from under that liability. What
was that event?
It is said that the return of the pass-book
and of the checks was an invitation to
Summers to examine them, and to report
promptly any discovered errors. So,
doubtless, itwas. Leather Manufac., etc.,
Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96; Zane, Banking, 265; United Security Co. v. Bank, 185
Pa. 586; Myers v. Bank, 193 'Pa. 1. But,
what is to be the consequence of Summers'
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omission thus to examine and-to report?
Is it to erase the liability of the bank to
him? Is it to extinguish its debt to him'?
The failure to notify the bank of error
would, doubtless, be in the nature of an
admission of the correctness of the acts of
the bank. The account furnished by it
would, in a sense, become astated account.
But are we to hold that it is to become
more? That it is to preclude any rectification of errors, however great? We see
no reason for so holding.
It might be that the omission within a
short time to notify the bank of error, of,
e. g., the forgery of the check, would induce it to continue to pay similar checks,
or would cause it to pretermit an opportunity to obtain indemnity for itself from
the forger, and were that so, it would be
eminently proper to cast the resulting loss
upon the depositor, whose inaction has
caused it. Is there room to suspect the
existence of this cause of loss in this case ?
Had the depositor examined the first
check he would have found that it was
forged, and had he notified the bank, it
would probably have examined the subsequent checks closely and discovered their
forgery. Summers, too, would have discovered reason for dismissing his clerk, and
had he done so the later forgeries would not
have occurred. We think the opportunity
to defraud, by the later checks, was the result of the negligence of Summers.
But, it was also the result of the negligence of the bank. The bank, as we have
said, did not examine any of the checks.
If it had, we have a right to assume that,
despite the negligence of Summers, it
would not have been imposed on. In
Leather Manufact. Bank v. Morgan,supra,
it is said by Harlan, J.: " Of course, if defendant's officers, before paying the altered
checks, could, by proper care and skill,
have detected the forgeries, then it cannot
receive a credit for the amount of these
checks, even if the depositor omitted all
examination of his account."
-Prima
facie the bank is liable to Summers fbr his
deposit, unless drawn out by genuine
check. If paying the money out isjustifled by a forged check, it must appear that
the bank exercised proper care. We cannot find such care.
It is suggested that if promptly notified
of the forgery of the first check, the bank

might have sought indemnity from the
clerk, of which it has been deprived, and
that, for this reason, it ought to be protected from a recovery for the first $400.
When a bank tries to cast on its depositor
a loss which has settled in itself, it ought
to be able to do more, than allege that it
might have been deprived of a chance to
indemnify himself. While it probably
should not be required distinctly to show
that it could have recovered from the
forger, the amount paid upon the forged
check, a reasonable probability that it
would have been able to procure this reimbursement ought to appear. We should
feel unwilling to excuse the defendant
from repaying his deficit to Summers becauseof a meresuggestion that the amount
might possibly have been recoverable from
the clerk, and that it is no longer recoverable. That it ever could have been recovered, or that, if it could have been, it can
no longer be, we should be loath to assume. However, it is unnecessary to decide this question, since the admitted negligence of the bank prevents its taking
advantage of the subsequent negligence of
the plaintiff.
The court below has allowed a recovery
for the sums last paid out. We think,
but for the bank's negligence, the recovery
should have been for all but the first, and
not for the first. But the bank's negligence precludes any recovery.
Judgment reversed.
AfAcFARLAND vs. NITTANY
VALLEY IY.
Trespass-Breachof contract to carryConsequent injury to passenger-emote
andproximatecause-egligencefor the

jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff engaged passage on the
line of the defendant company to a station
called Nigh, Centre County, and through
the negligence of the defendant company's
servant, the plaintiff was carried to Zion.
The distance from Zion to Nigh by road
was 7 miles, by rail If miles. It was night
time, and very cold and dark with flurries
of snow, and no dwelling near. The plaintiff decided to walk back by rail. While
on the way, without fault on the part of
either the plaintiff-or the defendant com-

THE FORUM
pany, the plaintiff was struck by the locomotive and injured. He was also frost
bitten. He seeks to recover for both the
injury and the frost bite. The jury finds
a special verdict of $500 damages for injuries, and $300 for the frost bites; subject
to the point reserved by the court, in law.
The plaintiff can recover on either point.
CLAYCoiB and CIsNEY for plaintiffs in
error.
The plaintiff is barred from recovery by
contributory negligence. Col. R. R. Co. v.
Martin, 17, A and E.R.R. . 592; (a) By not
heeding "stop, look and listen" rule.
169 Pa. 339. (b.) By walking on the track.
Mullurin v. D. L. & W. R. R. 81 Pa.;
Shean v. R. & R. R. R., 166 Pa. 354; R. R.
v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465. Negligence of defendant will not excuse plaintiff negligence concurring to cause accident. Pa. R.
R. v Aspell, 2 Pittsburg L. J. 26.
LONGBO3TTOm and VASTINE for defendant in error.
Negligent carrying of a passenger beyond destination renders carriers liable for
consequent damages. A & E. Ency. of L.,
Vol. 5, 584; Ehrgott v. N. Y. city, 96 N.
Y. 264; Pa. R. R. Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147;
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Kilgore, 32 Pa. 295; 13th
and 15th St. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Bondron, 92
Pa. 475.
Such negligence on part of carriers is
proximate cause of injury to passenger,
not due to contributory negligence, while
attempting to search destination. Ehrgott
v. N. Y. city, supra; Stultz v. Chicago &
N. W. R. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147; Pa. R. R.
v. Aspell, supra; Pa. R. R. v. Kilgore,
supra.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendants acknowledge that they
are liable in damages to the extent of $300
for the frost bites. The only question for
our decision is, whether or not the defendant company is liable in damages for the
other injuries suffered by the plaintiff. It
is a broad principle that a person walking
upon a railroad track, not at a crossing, is
a trespasser thereon. But this principle
has no application to this case.
After Mr. McFarland had purchased his
ticket to Nigh, the defendant company
was bound to carry the plaintiff safely to
that place, but not in the capacity of an
insurer. After carrying him pastNigh by
their own negligence, it was the defendant
company's duty to provide means to properly convey him to his destination. This
they did not do, but upon the arrival of
the train at Zion, a station one and a half
miles from Nigh, and a place near which
there were no houses, the plaintiff was unceremoniously put off the cars into the
cold, dark night. Three alternatives were
then open to Mr. McFarland: to stay
there and run the risk of freezing; to walk
back by road seven miles--if he knew such

road were in existence-and take his
chance of being overcome by the cold; or
to walk back on the railroad. He accepted
the latter.
It is a principle that any negligence on
the part of the plaintiff in looking out for
his safety would defeat his claim for damages. Whether or not he was negligent in
attempting to walk back to Nigh is a
question for the jury. The jury have decided that his act under the circumstances
was not negligence on his part, and we
cannot review their verdict. But, as a
matter of law, it is well said, "A person is
not chargeable with neglect of his own
safety when he exposes himself to one danger by trying to avoid another. In such
case the author of the original peril is answerable for all that follows." R. R. Co.
v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147.
We cannot say that the act of the conductor in putting the plaintiff off at Zion
was not the proximate causeof the plaintiff's .njury. The jury have found thac
the plaintiff's injuries were the natural
and probable consequences of the act of
the conductor. Therefore a new trial is
refused.
W. N. CooPER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The defendant contracted to carry MeFarland to a station called Nigh. It negligently carried him beyond Nigh to Zion.
Therein it broke its contract. McFarland
had a right to recover damages for this
breach. He found himself, when he
alighted at Zion, far from any dwelling
house. He was but 1 miles from his destination, by rail, while he was seven miles
therefrom by the ordinary road.
If the evidence showed that McFarland
could find no shelter nearer than Nigh, it
was right for him to go thither. To have
remained all night, shelterless, and exposed to cold and snow, would have been
reckless. But, he could have gone home by
the highway, as well as by the railroad. To
be on the railroad in such a night was
perilous. We are not prepared, however,
to say that it was ipso facto negligent, so
that should any accident ensue, there
could be no damages for it. Thejury seem
to have found that the injury to him occurred without the fault ofeither the plaintiff or the defendant. He was obliged to
balance the dangers of a walk of 1 miles
on the railroad, and of a walk of 7 miles
on the road, and it may not have been
wrongful in him to have preferred exposure to the former.
The result is that, being in the situation
into which the defendant placed him, and
doing the best he could to repair it he,
without fault, suffered a frost-bite and a
collision. The company was bound to
anticipate these, as not improbable effects.
They are not too remote. Cf. 5 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 699.
Judgment affirmed.

